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Introduction
The economic theory of games derives its name from
the study of strategic interactions - games - between
individuals known as players who are thought to be
rational, self-interested and informed.  The players use
the information to form beliefs about each other’s
intentions.  Their options for a decision are known as
strategies.  Their benefits or costs are known as payoffs
and their decisions can be an equilibrium.  The players
may choose whether or not to cooperate with each
other.  If they do not cooperate, the theory is that of a
non-cooperative game and the players are in a situation
of conflict.
The prospect of a conflict imbued with rational
calculations makes non-cooperative game theory
relevant for predicting the outcomes of a wide range of
public policy issues. For many such issues, the decisions
are made by organizations and nation-states rather than
by individuals. In order that game theory can continue
to apply, the decision-makers must be just as motivated
and informed as the rational individuals of a game.
Also, the decisions must not instead be propelled by
bureaucratic processes and pathologies, for these can
clearly displace original intentions.
This article describes three examples of non-
individualistic games. Global trade negotiations are
shown as a conflict where countries inevitably inflict
upon each other mutual harm. Union participation is
seen as the consequence of sequential responses where
a threat of reprisal is not credible. And finally, the
invasion of Iraq by the United States (US) and coalition
forces in 2003 is cast as a best response to an unknown
Iraqi weapons-decision given a tolerable ranking of
policy alternatives. For these and other examples, the
underlying uniformity is that of a conflict between non-
cooperative players that generates an outcome according
to some equilibrium.
The prisoners’ dilemma and trade
negotiations
The most-common concept of equilibrium in games is
undoubtedly that from an example known as the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. Two selfish and unprincipled
prisoners, confront a dilemma about whether or not to
confess to a crime that they both committed.  The game’s
defining characteristic is that both prisoners will want
to confess even though their collective interest is
maximized by neither of them doing so.
A Prisoner’s-Dilemma type of game can serve to explain
why international trade negotiations often fail to achieve
the removal of import tariffs.  Tariffs are inefficient because
they entice trading countries to locally-produce goods that
can be produced more cheaply abroad.  Their removal is
therefore potentially beneficial to all negotiating parties.
For some facts, consider how in 1995, when the World
Trade Organization (WTO) was created to foster trade,
international import tariffs were particularly excessive in
agriculture.  During that time, countries classified as “high-
income” were estimated to have been charging “low-
income” countries an average tariff of 15.1 percent for
agricultural imports, at the same time that the latter were
estimated to have been charging 21.5 percent upon the
former (Hertel et al, 2000).  The WTO felt it necessary
to moderate the balance through tariff-removal trade talks.
But never once did the launching of such talks succeed.
It failed in Seattle in November 1999 and again in Cancun
in September 2004.
Consider the suggestion that a 40 percent reduction in
tariffs could have increased the real income of all
countries (both high and low-income ones) by an
1 The author wishes to thank Richard Arnott, Karen Baehler, Jonathan
Boston, Bob Gregory, Gary Hawke, Amanda Wolf and other
colleagues for comments on earlier versions of this article. Any
errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
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estimated $60 billion dollars per year (see Hertel et al,
2000).  If the increase were apportioned according to
import volume, the real-income gain for the high-
income countries would have been $47 billion while
that for the low-income countries would have been $13
billion. (In 1995, the agricultural imports of high-
income countries from low-income ones were around
$351 billion while those by low-income countries from
high-income ones were around $95 billion.)
The payoffs in Figure 1 reflect the suggestion. Each of
the players – a low-income country and a high-income
one – can choose to Do Nothing about its high import
tariffs.  If both choose this strategy, there are no gains
to be realized from a more efficient system of trade. If
instead both choose Repeal Tariffs, the total gain of $60
billion is proportionately allocated as $47 and $13
billion.  If one country chooses to repeal its tariffs while
the other does not, there is a transitional (and equally
applicable) cost of $C billion in terms of local job losses.
These losses are emphasized because they are typically
lobbied for more than any gains a country may make
from cheaper imports.  The country that does not repeal
its tariffs can enjoy an interim benefit of $B billion,
corresponding to an increase in its export earnings.
The dominant-strategy
equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium
In Prisoners’-Dilemma games, the strategy chosen by
each player has a payoff that is superior to that of the
other strategy in all possible cases. This can be
generalized.  A strategy is said to be dominant if it is a
player’s best strategy regardless of what the other player
does.  If each of the players has a dominant strategy
(for example, Do Nothing in the preceding case), the
corresponding strategies are known as a Dominant-
Strategy equilibrium. A Dominant-Strategy equilibrium
is also a Nash equilibrium, defined as best-response
strategies that neither player will want to deviate from
given that the other does not. However, the former
requires that each of the two players has a dominant
strategy while the latter does not. Because of this a
Nash equilibrium can be made to apply to a wider
range of games.
To illustrate the difference between the two equilibrium
concepts, consider the removal of any export-earnings
advantage to the country that decides to do nothing if
the other repeals its tariffs. This is tantamount to
assuming that B is zero.  A consequence is that neither
of the players now has a dominant strategy.  While the
high-income country will still want to do nothing if
the low-income country repeals its tariffs (0 > -C), it
feels indifferent about what to do if the low-income
country decides to repeal its tariffs (it gets $47 billion
either way).  Its former choice Do Nothing is no longer
dominant because it is advantageous only if the low-
income country does nothing.  The rest of the time, the
strategy is felt indifferent toward. The same thing can be
said about Do Nothing if instead the strategy were instead
wielded by the low-income country.
The reduced advantageousness of Do Nothing qualifies
it for a reduced rank, that of a weakly-dominant strategy,
defined as clearly advantageous to use sometimes and
felt indifferent-toward the rest of the time. Above, the
“sometimes” is when the other country also does nothing
while “the rest of the time” is when the other country
repeals its tariffs. With both of the players now converted
to having a weakly-dominant strategy rather than a
dominant one, the strategies (Do Nothing, Do Nothing)
are now still an equilibrium.  But rather than this
equilibrium being a dominant-strategy one, it is now
It is apparent that each country is always better off
choosing Do Nothing even though the highest sum of
players’ payoffs can be that for both of them choosing
Repeal Tariffs. Such a sum for joint payoffs (of $60
billion) is highest provided that the net transitional
benefit (B-C) is less than $13 billion. Thus it can be
said that the repeated failures of global trade negotiations
are the consequence of a Prisoner’s dilemma, there being
a disparity between what players will want to choose
for themselves and what they ought to choose for their
collective interest. The proper role of government - or
the WTO in this example - is to find the power to
enforce a binding agreement that none of the players
wants for itself (see Victorio 2004 for other examples).
Low-income Country
Do Nothing Repeat Tariffs
High-Income Country
Do Nothing (0,0) (47+B, -C)
Repeat Tariffs (-C, 13+B) (47, 13)
Figure 1. Global Trade Payoffs:
Agricultural Imports, 1995
V
ol
um
e 
1,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
05
18
“merely” a Nash equilibrium because it is composed of
strategies that are best-responses to each other with
neither player having a dominant strategy yet neither
wanting to deviate from its choice.
Backward induction: union
membership reprisal
Weakly-dominant strategies can present the prospect
of there being more than one Nash equilibrium.  The
prospect is uncomfortable because it introduces
predictive imprecision: if the number of
predictions to a game becomes anywhere
close to the number of possible events,
there might as well be none.  In the
preceding example of weakly-dominant
strategies, a second possible Nash
equilibrium is that of (Repeal Tariffs,
Repeal Tariffs).  The reason is definitional:
for this pair of strategies, neither will want
deviate given that the other does not.  (If
the high-income country deviated while
the low-income one did not, its payoff
would remain at $47 billion, so why
deviate? Analogously so for the low-
income country.)
A single equilibrium can sometimes be narrowed if the
game is instead a sequence of moves rather than a set of
simultaneous decisions made by two players.  The
resulting description is known as a game tree or a
dynamic game.  The sequencing allows for an
elimination of Nash equilibrium solutions that are not
persuasive.
Thus consider a sequential game of two players, an
employee and an employer, where decisions pertain to
union membership.  In the US, it is estimated that
employees who join a union can earn a higher wage than
those who do not, the wage premium being between 12
and 18 percent depending upon the extent to which other
wage factors are controlled for (see, for instance, Budd
and Na 2000).  The reasons may stem from the greater
power that a collective membership possesses when
negotiating with an employer.
In the game, let the employee be the first to decide whether
or not to join a union.  Let the employer be the second to
decide, who in spite of legal duties can choose to Retaliate
against a union membership by way of punitive measures
pertaining to tenure and promotion.  The punitive
measures yield for the employer a benefit of B dollars per
employee-hour (in labour-cost savings) and entail a
potential cost of C.  The employer’s alternative is to Tolerate
the membership.  Given this and if the employee were to
join, the employee succeeds in obtaining a union wage of
$15 per hour.  If the employer were to retaliate, the wage is
reduced to $12 per hour.  Finally, if the employee decided
not to join the union, the obtainable wage is $13 per hour.
These payoffs are summarized in Figure 2.
To uncover whether the game has any Nash
equilibrium, one first investigates the optimal
decision for the player at the end of the game tree.
Then, given this decision, one works backward to
investigate the optimal decision for the preceding
player until the beginning of the game tree is reached.
If $(B-C) were negative (as may be reasonable to
assume of anti-discrimination laws), the employer’s
best response would be to tolerate the employee (zero
dollars being better than a loss of $(B-C)).  And given
that the employer decides to tolerate, the employee’s
best response would be to join the union ($15 being
better than $13).  The joint decisions are thus Join,
Tolerate, with payoffs ($15, $0), and these comprise
a Nash equilibrium because neither of the players will
want to deviate from its decision given that the other
does not.  This method of finding a Nash equilibrium
by investigating decisions backward is known as
backward induction. On this basis, the wage premium
of union members is the result of a sequential game
where membership has wage advantages to employees
and punitive measures are more costly than beneficial
to employers.
Figure 2. A Game Tree
First move: Employee
decides whether to
join union
Second move:
Employer decides
whether to retaliate
Payoffs:
(Employee,
Employer)
($13, $0)
Join
Not Join
Retaliate
Tolerate
($12, $(B-C)
($15, $0)
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Non-credible threats
The option to retaliate against the employee is an
example of a non-credible threat, defined as any threat
that a threatener does not want to carry out (for instance,
because it would imply for itself a loss) and will not
have to carry out if believed. Non-credible threats are
important because their presence can suggest the
existence of a secondary Nash equilibrium that is itself
not credible.  This becomes apparent if one summarized
the payoffs of a game tree according to a normal (matrix)
form. In Figure 3, the employer’s net benefit from
retaliation, previously regarded as negative, is
exemplified as -$1.
employer no longer has to carry out its threat of
retaliation, which it knows is costly. (The equilibrium
payoff to the employer is $0, not -$1, even though its
equilibrium strategy is Retaliate.) Knowing this, the
employee can gain by choosing to Join, which in turn
elicits no other best response from the employer but
Tolerate. As a result, what eventually re-emerges is the
first equilibrium of the game tree – Join, Tolerate. In
sum, the second equilibrium is not credible even though
it is a Nash equilibrium, because it is based upon a non-
credible threat that the employee must somehow believe
and which the employer does not want to carry out and
does not have to either.
Sub-games and sub-game
perfection
Another way of repudiating the credibility of the second
equilibrium is to say that it is not one that would emerge
if all of the best responses were tabulated.  The tabulation
is conducted by first uncovering all of the sub-games of
a game tree, each defined as any entire-remaining
portion of the game to the right of an available decision
node. When examined, each of the sub-games implies a
best-response for the player making the decision.  If all
of these best responses (corresponding to all of the sub-
games) are assembled together, the results are the
strategies of a Nash equilibrium that corresponds to the
credible one, e.g. the first equilibrium of the previous
game, not the second one.  The tabulation thus implies
that if there were ever an equilibrium based upon a non-
credible threat, it could be rigorously eliminated.
Applying the tabulation to the previous game tree, one
uncovers two available decision nodes and therefore two
In the normal form, there are two Nash equilibrium
solutions, not one.  The first is that previously
predicted by the game tree which is Join, Tolerate. The
second one is Not Join, Retaliate. This is also a Nash
equilibrium because it qualifies the definition that if
chosen by the players, neither will choose to deviate
given that the other does not. It can arise simply
because the employee may believe that the employer
would retaliate.
But in what sense is the second not as persuasive as the
first and therefore itself not credible? Because the
Figure 3. Union Membership in Normal Form
Employer
Retaliate Tolerate
Do Nothing (0,0) (47+B, -C)
Repeat Tariffs (-C, 13+B) (47, 13)
Employee
Figure 4. The Two Subgames. Payoffs: (Employee, Employer)
Another subgame: the employee
decides given the employerÕs best
response of ÒTolerateÓ
($13, $0)
Join
Not Join
Retaliate
Tolerate
($15, $0)
One subgame: the
employer decides
whether to retaliate
( _, $0)
( _, $1)
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Game trees with imperfect
information: Iraq versus the US
Quite often the one who makes the second move does
not know which strategy was chosen by the one who
made the first move.  For instance, while the employer
might know the employee’s possible strategies, privacy
laws might prohibit it from immediately finding out
which of the two was chosen at the point of having to
decide whether or not to Tolerate. In such a case, the
game is said to be dynamic with imperfect information.
An example is the second invasion of Iraq by the US in
2003.  The decision to invade was partly motivated by
unsure expectations that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein had
developed unacceptable weapons of mass destruction.
However, after the invasion inspectors could not find
any strong evidence that such weapons were ever
developed during the years that Iraq was under UN
sanctions. In retrospect, the US made a decision to
invade not knowing for certain whether or not the
weapons had been developed.
The invasion can be regarded as the culmination of a
dynamic game where Iraq moved first, followed by
the US (see Figure 5). The game tree for it is such
that Iraq can choose from among three strategies:
Develop the weapons, Not Develop the weapons or
Comply in Full with UN sanctions and resolutions.
The third strategy – Comply in Full – includes not
just avoiding the weapons development but also
Invade
Not Invade
Second move: The
US chooses whether
or not to invade
(2, 1)
Develop
Weapons
Not Develop
(0, 3)
First move: Iraq
chooses whether or
not to comply
Comply in Full
Invade
Not Invade
(4, 0)
(3, R)
(1, 2)
Point
Rankings
(Iraq, US)
Figure 5. Imperfect Information: Iraq vs. US
sub-games.  In no particular order, the first is all that
remains beginning from the employer deciding whether
or not to tolerate the employee. The second is all that
remains beginning from the employee deciding whether
or not to join the union after the employer has decided
upon its best response. This second sub-game is the
entire game itself; in the right-hand-side in Figure 4 it
is shown in a reduced form, that of the second-mover
(the employer) having already decided upon its best
response (Tolerate).
In the first sub-game, the best response is for the
employer to Tolerate. In the second, the best response is
for the employee to Join (given that the employer decides
to Tolerate). These best responses form the strategies of
the Nash equilibrium (Join, Tolerate), a solution that
eliminates the non-credible equilibrium that was
previously discussed (Not Join, Retaliate).
Clearly, an equilibrium that derives from the best
responses of all possible sub-games must have a special
rigour attached to it.  For this reason, such equilibrium
solutions are known as sub-game Perfect.  Formally, a Nash
equilibrium is also a sub-game-Perfect Nash equilibrium
if the strategies contained in it are the best responses
obtained from tabulating all the sub-games of a tree.  A
sub-game-Perfect Nash equilibrium is for a game-tree the
way a dominant-strategy equilibrium is for a matrix of
payoffs. Each is a more-focussed definition of an
equilibrium than is merely required of a Nash.
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providing full disclosure of all military and economic
activities in order to avoid reprisals.  If this strategy
is pursued, the US does not have to make a move
and the game ends.  For any of the others, the US
can choose from either Invade Iraq or Not Invade.
An oval is drawn around the options of the US in
order to reflect its uncertainty about which strategy
has been chosen by Iraq.
The payoffs are point rankings that might have reflected
each country’s national interests. Iraq is regarded as best
off if it develops the weapons and the US does not invade
(3 points).  Its next-ranked outcome is not developing
the weapons while invaded (2 points): for the
destruction caused by the war is compensated by
vindication in the international community. Next is
developing the weapons despite a subsequent invasion
(1 point).  While this leads to destroyed weapons, the
prospect of it is not nearly as severe as the loss of self-
governance implied by complying in full (0 points).  The
payoffs suggest that Iraq will not develop the weapons
if the US were to invade (3>2) and will develop if the
US did not invade (4>1).
The US is regarded as obtaining a favourable outcome
if Iraq complies with all UN sanctions and resolutions
(3 points).  Also favourable is the event pertaining to
Iraq not developing the weapons and itself not having
to invade (2 points). Both of these outcomes enhance
its stature. Next preferred is the necessary evil of invading
Iraq given that Iraq has developed the weapons (1 point).
For this outcome, its war cost is regarded as justified by
the added benefit of disarming what it perceives to be a
malevolent dictator.  Regarded as unsatisfactory is Iraq
developing the weapons and itself not invading (0
points), an outcome it considers an admission of defeat.
Listed as an unknown R, is the rank of the outcome
that eventually materialized: that of Iraq not developing
the weapons and the US deciding to invade.
Subjective probabilities as beliefs
Suppose that the game is at the point where Iraq has
not complied in full with UN resolutions. However,
the US does not know anything more. On what basis
could the US eventually have decided upon an invasion?
A useful way to begin is to conjecture that the US had
in mind a subjective probability, p, associated with Iraq
having secretly developed the weapons. This subjective
probability, pertaining to what the initiating player (Iraq)
may have chosen, is known as the responding player’s
belief. If this belief were to be combined with an
acceptable rank, an invasion can be justified as having
the highest expected payoff.
For example, suppose that the US ranked Not Develop,
Invade as 1 point, (i.e. R=1), a value lower than the
rank of 2 points for Not Develop, Not Invade.  At the
same time, suppose that the US also had a (probability)
belief of 60 percent that Iraq had indeed developed the
weapons (p=0.6).  Then the expected payoffs for the US
can be calculated using the beliefs as weights.  For a
decision to Invade, the expected payoff is 1 point (i.e.
0.6(1)+0.4(1) = 1).  For Not Invade, the expected payoff
is 0.8 points (i.e. 0.6(0)+0.4(2) = 0.8).  The higher of
the expected payoffs is thus for an invasion.
Accordingly, the values for the US’s ranking of an
invasion, R, are critically related to its belief, p. Given a
fixed value for one of these variables, a high value for
the other becomes a compelling reason for an invasion.
A relationship between the two variables can be found
by comparing the expected payoff of an invasion against
the one for not invading, and then characterizing the
values for R.  If it were to invade, the US’s expected
payoff depends upon its belief and its ranking of an
invasion, and this expected payoff is equal to the (points)
expression: p(1)+(1-p)(R). (By definition of a
probability, (1-p) is the US’s belief that Iraq did not
develop the weapons.) If it were not to invade, its
expected payoff is equal to p(0)+(1-p)(2).
From comparing the two expected payoffs, the US
would be expected to invade only if its expected payoff
from doing so, p(1)+(1-p)(R), were greater than the one
for not invading, [(1-p)(2)]. From this condition emerges
a condition for the rank: R must be greater than the
ratio given by (2-3p)/(1-p).  For example, R must be at
least 2 points (i.e. greater than the rank of Not Develop,
Not Invade) if the US’s belief were zero (i.e. if p=0). A
rank greater than 1 point is sufficient if the belief were
fifty-fifty (i.e. if p=0.5). A rank greater than 0 is sufficient
if the US were two-thirds sure that Iraq had developed
the weapons (i.e. if p=2/3).
The eventual outcome of the game (Not Develop,
Invade) can thus be interpreted as the US’s best
response to an unknown Iraqi decision based upon its
belief and ranking of an invasion. That Iraq might have
anticipated such an invasion would then have been a
compelling-enough reason for it to refrain from
V
ol
um
e 
1,
 N
um
be
r 
3 
20
05
22
developing the weapons. The outcome is analyzed
differently from that of a conventional Nash
equilibrium because the payoffs of the responding
player (the US) are accompanied by a belief about an
uncertain precedent.  The belief is just as important as
the payoffs in terms of projecting an equilibrium that
was consistent with what happened.
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
The equilibrium outcome (Not Develop, Invade) is an
example of a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium which can
be defined as strategies chosen for a dynamic game of
imperfect information where players form beliefs about
unknown previous decisions. The inclusion of beliefs
makes the equilibrium distinctive from that of either a
Nash or a sub-game-Perfect Nash equilibrium.  The term
Bayesian derives from Bayes’s theorem, which in statistics
describes the solution for a conditional probability given
some knowledge of the likelihood of preceding events.
Cast in terms of this theorem, the US’s belief about
Iraq’s unknown decision is a conditional probability
derived from knowing Iraq’s non-compliance with UN
resolutions and its apparent history of having used such
weapons in the past.
Conclusion
The preceding examples have all been founded on the
assumptions that players are rational, self-interested and
informed. Also, they ignore other important player
considerations such as ethical commitments. The reality
of policy making of course is much more complex, for
one (or more) of these assumptions may not apply.
Other social sciences are more acknowledging of this
reality than is the science of economics upon which game
theory is based.
But there are helpful developments from within the
theory itself. In contravening evolutionary games, there
is no presumption that the players are rational
(Kahneman 2003).  Strategies are instead compelled by
genetic tendency. Those that result in superior rewards
have a greater chance of being passed on to future
offspring. The recipients in turn become so dominant
in number that mutant strategies are unable to invade
successful ones. The outcomes that eventually persist
are instead defined as evolutionary-stable equilibrium
solutions, rather than as Nash solutions, precisely
because they are thought of as being driven by
Darwinian self-selection rather than by rational
intentions.
The predictive implications of such evolutionary games
remain unexplored. But if genetic tendency were instead
organizational predisposition, and if predisposition were
acquired from strategies that were previously successful,
then the decisions of organizations and nation-states
can still be game-theoretic even without the theory’s
usual assumptions.
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